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Abstract
The practice of lobbying in the interest of economic or social groups plays an important role
in the policy making process of most economies. While no data is available at this stage to
examine the success of lobbies in exerting influence on specific policy issues, we perform a
first systematic multi-layer network analysis of a large lobby registry. Here we focus on the
domains of finance and climate and we combine information on affiliation and client rela-
tions from the EU transparency register with information about shareholding and interlock-
ing directorates of firms. We find that the network centrality of lobby organizations has no
simple relation with their lobbying budget. Moreover, different layers of the multiplex net-
work provide complementary information to characterize organizations’ potential influence.
At the aggregate level, it appears that while the domains of finance and climate are sepa-
rated on the layer of affiliation relations, they become intertwined when economic relations
are considered. Because groups of interest differ not only in their budget and network cen-
trality but also in terms of their internal cohesiveness, drawing a map of both connections
across and within groups is a precondition to better understand the dynamics of influence
on policy making and the forces at play.
Introduction
Lobbies express the interest of specific groups within the society and the economy (e.g., banks
or consumers) and their pressure on regulators constitute part of the process by which policies
are shaped [1–3]. Indeed, the study of interest group politics has long been an important sub-
field of political economy. In particular, the problem of regulation is seen there as “discovering
when and why an industry or other group of likeminded people is able to use the state for its
purposes” [4]. On the one hand, social pressure (in particular from NGO) can be a crucial
determinant to induce firms to better deal with the negative externalities of their activities. On
the other hand, social pressure creates an incentive for firms to act collectively against the activ-
ists [5] (e.g. with green-washing initiatives). In this respect, it has been emphasized that firms
have incentives to put in place sophisticated strategies such as artificial grassroots campaigns,
in order to distort the information provided to regulators [6]. In particular, the relation
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between negative externalities such as pollution and market power has been analysed in the
sector of non-renewable resources [7].
Many countries enforce or encourage lobby activities to be disclosed and several register
exist (such as the US register at the House of Representatives, or the EU transparency register),
from which reports are compiled regarding the size, the number and composition of lobbies.
However, little research has been carried out so far on the structure of the networks in which
lobbies operate [8]. This is somewhat surprising since we can expect the network structure of
lobbies to play an important role for at least two reasons. First, lobbies can be thought of as
intermediaries between economic and social groups on the one hand and policymaking bodies
on the other hand. Therefore, the influence they are able to exert could depend on the arrange-
ment of ties their ties to economic and social actors, political parties, and policymaking bodies.
Second, a cohesive group of lobby organizations could be more effective in influencing policy
making than a disperse collection of lobby organizations [9]. Given the increasing importance
of empirical studies of networks [10, 11], in this paper we aim to fill the gap in the literature.
While here we do not examine the success of lobbies in exerting influence on specific policy
issues, we performwhat to our knowledge is the first systematic characterization from an
empirical perspective of a large lobby network. Such a characterization is a precondition to fur-
ther studies that should be aimed at better understand the dynamics of influence on policy
making and the forces at play [12]. In particular, drawing a “map” of lobbies and measuring
their cohesion and fragmentationmay help policymakers to better deal with the pressure from
lobbies. Conversely, public interest lobbies, which are typically outnumbered by industry lob-
bies, can see how to get better heard in the policymaking process.
In summary, we construct a multiplex lobby network [13–16] by combining the data from
the EU transparency register and the Bureau van Dijk database Orbis. The multiplex network
consists of four layers of different types of relations, including affiliations among organizations,
client-customer relations, interlocking directorates and stock shares ownership relations. We
focusmostly on the domains of climate and finance, as paradigmatic cases.We first study the
structure of each network layer and we then consider the network as whole. We compute cen-
trality measures, both on individual network layers and taking into account all layers, as prox-
ies for the potential influence of organizations in the lobby network.We find that while the
budget of an organization to represent interests (hereafter, “lobby money”) is certainly impor-
tant, it is not a good predictor of the centrality of the organization in the lobby network.
Because we can reasonably expect centrality to affect the ability of lobby organizations to exert
influence, this result suggests that there is more to influence than simply the budget and that
the position in the network structure should matter. We further proceed the analysis from a
microscopic level (individual organizations) to a mesoscopic level (10 different groups, e.g.
banking, insurance, energy, etc.), to a macroscopic level (finance and climate). We find that
certain structural properties can only be appreciated in the multiplex network and not in the
single layers. For instance, the inter-group and inter-domain interactions [17] become visible
only when the shareholding and interlocking network level are taken into account. At the
group level, we propose to complement the statistics on budget with those on cohesiveness, the
rational being that groups that have at the same time large budget but also strong internal cohe-
siveness have more chances to exert influence.
Results
We consider the 6637 lobby organizations in the EU transparency register updated at Novem-
ber 2014 and we construct a multiplex network (hereafter “lobby network”) among them con-
sisting of four different layers conveying information and economic interests in a specific way
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as described further below. Three layers, i.e. affiliation, shareholding and client are directed
networks, while the interlocking level is undirected. Shareholding and interlocking networks
are in principle weighted, but for simplicity we regard them as unweighted networks in this
paper. The data collection procedure is described in the Methods section.
We look at three different scales. The microscopic scale of the individual organizations is
the scale at which one usually considers a network. At the macroscopic scale, we are interested
in how broad policy domains are related and in this paper we focus only on finance and cli-
mate. We further look at a mesoscopic scale by categorizing organizations into groups of eco-
nomic interest (e.g. banking, insurance etc. in finance; and energy, utilities, etc. in climate). In
the following, we first provide some basic statistics of the lobby network at the microscopic
level. We then investigate the relation between network measures and quantities related to the
lobbying effort of groups and organizations (e.g. money and number of representatives). We
further propose a centrality measure to study the influence of lobby organizations in the net-
work. Finally, we analyze the connectivity patterns of the lobby network at the mesoscopic and
macroscopic levels.
Lobby Money and Network Measures
Organizations are registered in one of the following 13 categories: companies; trade, busines-
s&professional associations; trade unions; other similar organisations; professional consultan-
cies; law firms; self-employed consultants; non-governmental organisations, platforms and
networks and similar; think tanks and research institutions; academic institutions; organisa-
tions representing churches and religious communities; local, regional and municipal authori-
ties; other public or mixed entities. The visualization of the lobby network is shown in Fig 1.
Each category is marked by a different color. In the network, the companies (in red) appear to
be tightly connected by the shareholding and interlocking links. Both companies and NGOs
(in blue) are affiliated to some business associations and trade unions (in pink). They are also
clients of the professional consultants and law firms (in cyan). Qualitatively, the companies
appear to form a core in the middle of the network while the NGO’s are scattered in different
parts of the network. The detailed structure of the shareholding and interlocking network lay-
ers is shown in Fig A in S1 File. One can see that companies tend to be clustered by countries
in line with previous work on ownership and geography [18].
The basic statistical properties of each layer of the lobby network are shown in Table 1. The
affiliation layer has the largest number (i.e. 2472) of nonisolated nodes while the shareholding
layer has the largest number (i.e. 4175) of links. The degree distribution in the shareholding
and affiliation networks is very heterogeneous while the degree distribution in the interlocking
and client networks is much less heterogenous (see Fig B in S1 File). This is also shown by the
the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index of the degree sequence (H = (∑k)2/∑(k2)) in Table 1
which measures the number of leading nodes (with respect to degree) in the networks. In the
shareholding and affiliation networks, the fraction of significant nodes (i.e.H/N) is low, indi-
cating that a small number of nodes attract most of the links. In the interlocking and client net-
works, the fraction of significant nodes is higher, indicating that most of the nodes have similar
degree. Due to the high link density in the shareholding network, the average shortest path is
low (2.12) and clustering coefficient is high (0.63) in this network layer. In the affiliation, share-
holding and client layers, the degree assortativity is negative (−0.16, −0.61,−0.26 respectively),
indicating that small degree nodes tend to connect to high degree nodes. On the contrary, the
degree assortativity in the interlocking layer is positive (0.32). This means that big organiza-
tions tend to have common directors with each other rather than with small organizations
[19]. The relations between node degree in different layers are shown in Fig C in S1 File.
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Fig 1. The visualization of the lobby network. The organizations of different types are marked in different colors as follows, red: companies; pink: trade,
bussiness & professional associations; cyan: professional consultants and law firms; blue: NGOs; green: think tanks and research institutions. The size of
the node is proportional to the number of lobbyists of the organization.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062.g001
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We then move to study the relation between “lobby money” and other properties of the
lobby organizations. Hereafter, lobby money refers to the “estimated costs” of each organisa-
tion “directly related to representing interests to EU institutions in the last year”. Notice that
this number is an estimation provided by the organizations themselves. The relations between
lobby money and organizations’ operating revenue and total assets are shown in Fig D in S1
File. In Fig 2 we also study the relation between the connectivity degree of organizations on the
y-axis and their “lobby money” on the x-axis in different network layers. In the figure, the bub-
ble size represents the number of lobbyists in each organization.
In general, we do not observe clear patterns in the relation between degree and lobby
money. Although, in some cases the Pearson correlation turns out to be around 0.5, the scatter
plots show that organizations with the same degree can have lobby money varying across sev-
eral orders of magnitude. In the affiliation layer, the nodes with larger out-degree (i.e. number
of members) show some tendency to have larger lobby money. However, organizations with
similar out-degree can have very large variance in the lobby money and the Pearson correlation
is rather low, i.e. 0.46. The situation is similar in the interlocking layer, with the Pearson corre-
lation between the nodes’ interlocking degree and lobby money equal to 0.52. In the sharehold-
ing network, the correlation between the out-degree (i.e. number of held companies) and lobby
money is very weak, with a Pearson correlation of −0.15. Notice that the large out-degree orga-
nizations are all finance organizations. Finally, in the client layer, the lobby money is not avail-
able and law firms and professional consultants report instead the “turnover realized by the
organization in representing the interests of clients”. The Pearson correlation of in-degree
(number of clients) vs turnover is 0.67. The organizations with large in-degree have some ten-
dency to have both large turnover and number of lobbyists.
Overall, the results indicate that lobby money is not a good predictor of the connectivity
degree of organizations in the lobby network. At a first thought, this could be surprising since
one could expect the organizations with larger budget to be also more connected in the various
networks. To further investigate this point, we analyze the centrality of the organizations.
Centrality
We want to capture the influence of each organization in the lobby network by means of a net-
work centrality measure. Following a common approach in the literature we use a feedback-
centrality akin to the Katz centrality [20] and to Page-Rank [21]. In particular, there are two
ways to investigate the centrality of nodes. For instance, in the affiliation network, one can con-
sider the in-centrality in which an organization is important if, recursively, it has many impor-
tant members.We can also consider the out-centrality in which an organization is important
if, recursively, it is affiliated to and thus influencingmany important organizations. Similarly,
in the ownership network layer, the out-centrality measures the importance of shareholders,
while the in-centrality of a company is higher if it has many important shareholders. The
Table 1. The basic statistical properties of each layer of the lobby network. N is the number of nonisolated nodes. E is the number of links. hki is the
average degree of the network. H is the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index of the degree sequence. d is the average shortest path length of the network. c is
the average clustering coefficient of the network. r is the assortativity coefficient of the network. We consider these networks as undirected when calculating
these indices.
layer N E hki H d c r
affiliation 2472 3221 1.3 210 6.57 0.04 -0.16
shareholding 383 4175 10.9 23 2.12 0.63 -0.61
interlocking 378 862 2.28 209 4.37 0.17 0.32
client 573 467 0.8 110 6.82 0 -0.26
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062.t001
The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062 October 28, 2016 5 / 15
notion of centrality can be then extended to the multiplex network by including all the link
types: affiliation, shareholding and interlocking relations [13–16, 22, 23] (seeMethods). In this
case, the centrality is based on a iterative process across all layers in the network. By accounting
for this layer-layer interaction, a less connected node in one layer might eventually turn out to
have high centrality if it is well connected in other layers. Therefore, the latter way of comput-
ing centrality captures the interaction between the layers in the multiplex network.
The scatter plot of organizations’ in-centrality in the affiliation network versus their lobby
money is shown in Fig 3(a) and the scatter plot of organizations’ out-centrality in the multiplex
network versus their lobby money is shown in Fig 3(b). In general, there is no simple relation
between centrality and lobby money (the Pearson correlation coefficients in these two figures
are respectively 0.172 and 0.074). This means that lobby money is not a good predictor of how
influential organizations are (assuming of course that the centrality as defined here captures to
some extend the influence of organizations). This also indicates that information on centrality
of organization is a valuable quantity that complements the information on their lobby money.
Fig 2. (a) Scatter plot of nodes’ in-degree in the affiliation network (i.e. number of members) versus the lobby money (i.e. estimated cost). (b) Scatter plot
of nodes’ out-degree in the shareholding network (i.e. number of held companies) versus the lobby money. (c) Scatter plot of nodes’ degree in the
interlocking network (i.e. number of organizations with at least one common management) versus the lobby money. (d) Scatter plot of nodes’ degree in
the client network (i.e. number of clients) versus the turnover representing the interests of clients. The size of each bubble is proportional to the number of
lobbyists of the organization. Organizations in different groups are marked by different colors. The organizations in (d) are not colored because they are
law firms and professional consultants, and not assigned to any of the group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062.g002
The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations
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Therefore, neglecting the network structure (as in most of the literature) will miss a large
amount of information when analyzing the influence of lobby organizations.
Overall, the scatter plots in Fig 3 provide the following information.While large lobby
money does not imply large influence, there are some organizations that have both large lobby
money and centrality, such as the European banking federation in Fig 3(a) and the Deutsche
Bank in Fig 3(b). This could be interpreted as an indication that they both have the financial
means and the social capital to influence the policymaking process around topics in which
they have an interest. The names of few top players are displayed in Fig 3. The names of the top
20 players are listed in Table B in S1 File.
Interestingly, the organizations with high in-centrality are not the same as those with high
out-centrality. For the in-centrality, the top players are mainly professional associations
involved, respectively, in energy, financial markets, insurance and banking. This reflects of
course the definition of in-centrality because such professional organizations have member-
ships frommany other important organizations. For the out-centrality, the top players are
mainly companies in either asset management, or banking. This is due to the fact that they
hold shares of many important companies.
Connectivity patterns at meso- and macro-scale
We further investigate the lobby network at the mesoscopic and macroscopic levels [24], see
results in Fig 4. As mentioned above, at the macroscopic level, the organizations are selected if
they belong to two paradigmatic domains on which we focus in this paper, namely the finance
domain and climate domain. By climate domain, we actually mean CO2-intensive sectors, but we
use the climate label for brevity. Accordingly, at the mesoscopic level the organizations are classi-
fied into 10 groups of economic interest related to the financial sector (i.e. “banking”, “insurance”,
“pension”, “asset management”, “finance other”) and climate sectors (i.e., “energy”, “utility”,
“material”, “transportation”, “climate other”), as shown in Table 2. If they do not belong to any of
these groups, they are discarded from the analysis. In this section,we study the connectivity pat-
tern in the group networks and we discuss the relations within and across the two domains.
Affiliation Layer. The first network layer is the affiliation network. From the EU transpar-
ency register data we extract the affiliation relations between organizations, whereby a link
Fig 3. (a) Scatter plot of node’ in-centrality in the affiliation network versus the lobby money. (b) Scatter plot of node’ out-centrality in the multiplex lobby
network versus the lobby money. The size of each bubble is proportional to the number of lobbyists of the organization. Organizations in different groups
are marked by different colors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062.g003
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from organization i to organization jmeans that organization i is a member of organization j
(or affiliated to j). This type of relation reflects common economic sector activity and/or com-
mon economic interests with respect to regulation. The visualization of this network at the
mesoscopic level is shown in Fig 4(a).
At the macroscopic scale, this layer displays a strong community structure [25], in the sense
that links among organizations within finance and within climate are much more numerous
than the links among organizations across domains. As shown in Table 3, the number of links
within the finance domain is 178 and the number of links within the climate domain is 233. In
contrast, the total number of links between finance and climate is only 16. Besides the number
of links, we also measure a quantity called intra-link ratio which is defined as the number of
links within a domain divided by the total number of links of the domain (see results in
Table A in S1 File). The intra-link ratio for the finance domain is 92% and the intra-link ratio
Fig 4. (a) the affiliation links between different groups. (b) the shareholding links between different groups. (c) the interlocking links
between different groups. (d) The scatter plot of the lobby cohesiveness versus the lobby money within groups. The size of the
bubbles in (a)(b)(c) is proportional to the number of organizations in the group. The size of the link between two groups is
proportional to the number of links from the organizations in one group to the organizations in the other group in the original
network. The size of the points in (d) is proportional to the total number of lobbyists of the group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062.g004
The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062 October 28, 2016 8 / 15
for the climate domain is 94%. In order to investigate how significant this observation is, we
compare the observed results to their expected values obtained from a sample of networks
where the links among the organizations are reshuffled keeping the degree sequence
unchanged [26]. After the link reshuffling, the number of links within the finance and climate
domain decreases from 178 to 80.8±5.8 and from 233 to 135.8±5.8 respectively, while the total
number of links across domains increases from 16 to 210.4 ± 5.8. Equivalently, the intra-link
ratio decreases from 92% to 28% ± 3% in finance domain and from 94% to 39% ± 2% in climate
domain.
At the mesoscopic scale, a similar result holds. For instance, the number of links within
each group both in finance and climate is much larger than what could be expected by chance.
Table 1 provides the number of links in each group, as well as the average number (plus or
minus one standard deviation) in the reshuffled sample. For example, the number of links
within the banking group decreases from 43 to 10.3 ± 2.8 after link reshuffling (Equivalently,
the intra-link ratio decreases from 43% to 8% ± 2%). Similar phenomenon is observed in other
groups, see Tables 2 and 3 and Table A in S1 File. These results indicate that there is a hierar-
chical community structure [25] in the affiliation network, i.e. the partition based on the sector
corresponds to a possible community structure both at the macroscopic and mesoscopic level.
Shareholding and Interlocking Layers. The second and third network layers are the
shareholding network and the interlock network.We match the organizations in the EU trans-
parency register (the subset of the companies) with the ORBIS database and we extract the
shareholding and interlocking relations among them. In a shareholding relation a link from
organization i to organization jmeans that company i own shares of company j. This type of
Table 2. The number of links within each group in the empirical networks (i.e. links) and the randomly reshuffled networks (i.e. links*).
affiliation shareholding interlock overall
group size links links* links links* links links* links links*
banking 75 43 10.3±2.8 84 84.3±3.6 4 5.1±1.6 131 99.6±4.3
insurance 29 17 1.8±1.3 13 12.4±1.9 1 0.2±0.5 31 14.5±2.2
pension 7 1 0.0±0.1 0 0±0 0 0±0 1 0.0±0.1
asset mng 21 6 0.4±0.6 3 4.0±1.0 0 0.0±0.14 9 4.4±1.4
finance other 75 31 9.1±2.8 0 0.1±0.3 0 0.5±0.65 31 9.7±2.9
energy 83 31 7.1±1.9 0 0.1±0.3 1 0.6±0.67 32 7.8±1.9
utility 52 2 0.1±0.2 2 1.0±1.0 7 4.1±1.8 11 5.1±2.1
material 54 12 1.4±1.3 1 1.2±1.1 1 1.0±0.8 14 3.6±2.0
transportation 45 15 1.0±1.0 2 0.2±0.4 1 0.6±0.7 18 1.8±1.3
climate other 208 91 31.8±3.6 0 0±0 0 0±0 91 31.8±3.6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062.t002
Table 3. The number of links within and between domains in the empirical networks (i.e. links) and
the randomly reshuffled networks (i.e. links*). In the affiliation network, i! j means i is affiliated to j. In
the sharesholding network, i! j means i is holding share of j. The interlock network is an undirected network,
i! j means the number of common managers between i and j.
within finance within climate finance!climate climate!finance
links links* links links* links links* links links*
affiliation 178 80.8±5.77 233 135.8±5.77 7 104.2±5.77 9 106.2±5.77
shareholding 281 279.4±1.77 14 12.4±1.77 400 401.6±1.77 7 8.6±1.77
interlock 19 14.0±2.1 32 27.0±2.1 31 41.1±4.2 31 41.1±4.2
overall 478 374.2±6.1 279 175.2±6.1 438 546.8±7.0 47 155.8±7.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158062.t003
The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations
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relation reflect an interest of company i in the economic performance of company j [10]. Con-
versely, in the interlocking relation, a link from organization i to organization jmeans that
company i and j share at least one director or manager in their boards. This type of relation
allows companies to share information and insights on economic trends. The visualization of
the shareholding and interlocking networks at the mesoscopic level are shown in Fig 4(b) and
4(c), respectively.
The interlocking network layer displays some level of community structure, although not as
marked as the affiliation layer. Indeed the number of links between finance and climate are
smaller than what would be expected from a random process of link formation given the degree
sequence. Yet the number of links is still comparable to the number of links within finance and
within climate. After link reshuffling, the number of links within finance and within climate
decreases from 19 to 14 ± 2.1 and from 32 to 27 ± 2.1, respectively (the intra-link ratio thus
decreases from 34% to 24% ± 4% within finance and from 52% to 43% ± 3% within climate).
The links between finance and climate, on the contrary, increases from 31 to 41.1 ± 4.2. Thus,
at the level of groups, the interlocking links are very sparse within each group and the evidence
of community is less obvious.
Note that that there is an entire stream of works on both interlock and ownership networks
and that our study here only focuses on a subset of the interlock and ownership network,
namely the one consisting of links among firms that at the same time have their own represen-
tative advocacy office appearing in the EU lobby register. Our results are in line with those
found in the literature. While earlier studies reported on statistical properties of these networks
in selected countries [27–30], more recent works analyzed the conditional deviations from ran-
domness of the interlock network [31], and the resilience of its core with respect to policy
reforms [32–34].
In contrast with the interlock and with the affiliation layer, the shareholding layer displays
many inter-domain linkages. In particular, the number of relations from finance to climate is
even larger than the number of relations within the finance domain. As shown in Table 3, the
number of links from finance to climate is 400 while the number of links within finance is 281.
The relations from climate to finance are instead very few. There are only 7 such links. This sit-
uation reflects the tendency of financial companies to invest in real sector companies. Similar
results hold for economic groups: for instance the number of links from banks to other groups
in the climate domain are more numerous than those within the banking group. Specifically,
there are 230 links from banks to groups in climate and 84 links from banks to banks. Similarly,
insurance and asset management hold many more shares in groups such as utilities and materi-
als than in their own groups. However, they hold many shares in the banking group. For the
insurance group, the number of links to climate organizations, banks and itself are respectively
100, 42 and 13. For the asset management group, the number of links to climate organizations,
banks and itself are respectively 69, 29 and 3. Interestingly, both the results at the domain and
at the group level are consistent with what would be expected from the network reshuffling.
This means that the degree sequence drives most of the structure in this network layer.
Client Layer. The fourth network layer is the client network. From the EU transparency
register we also extract the client relations, where a link from organization i to organization j
means that organization i is a client of organization j, which can be either a law firms or a pro-
fessional consultant. This type of relation reflects the fact that the law firm/ consultant is acting
in the interest of the client organization with respect to the European Commission. The visuali-
zation of this network at the mesoscopic level is shown in Fig E in S1 File.
Law firms and professional consultants (LFPC) acting in the interest of organizations in the
finance and climate domain are a group of 72 organizations. The network structure is simply a
star network in which all groups have linkages pointing to LFPC in the center. The four groups
The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations
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with highest number of links to LFPC are climate other (34 links), finance other (18 links),
banking (14 links) and material (14 links). In order to remove the size effect, we also calculate
the mean degree of each group, the four groups with the highest client degree are insurance
(hki = 0.28), material (hki = 0.26), finance other (hki = 0.24) and banking (hki = 0.19).
Lobby cohesiveness. The advantage of considering the system as a multilayer network is
that one can understand the relation between lobby organizations in a more comprehensive
way. The single layer case can only provide one type of relation between lobby organizations,
while the multilayer network can show different types of interactions between organizations.
For instance, with only the shareholding layer, one can only see that the banking sector is hold-
ing shares of other sectors.What one would miss out in this case is that in the affiliation layer
sectors have very strong community structure such that the links in reality are not only point-
ing from banks to other lobby organizations. With a complete picture of the network, one can
understand better which sector has strongest lobby power.
We finally aggregate links of different types and calculate the total number of links within
each groups (i.e. intra-links). In the “climate other” and in the “finance other” groups, we
extract manually the organizations representing the public interest, based on their profile and
declared goals in the register, and we denote them respectively as “public climate” group (87
organizations) and “public finance” group (6 organizations). We then compute the number of
intra-links per node for each group and we use it as a measurement for the group’s lobby
cohesiveness. In Fig 4(d), we present the scatter plot of the lobby cohesiveness versus the
lobby money of the group. We see that the lobby cohesiveness of most of the groups are
around or below 0.5 except banking and insurance groups. The public climate and public
finance group both have low lobby money and lobby cohesiveness. Even though banking and
insurance groups do not have the highest lobby money, their lobby cohesiveness is the highest
(1.8 and 1.1 respectively).
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we combine the data from the EU transparency register and the Orbis database
to construct a multiplex lobby network consisting of the affiliation, shareholding, interlocking
and client relations between lobby organizations. We first study the lobby network at the
microscopic level. The degree distribution in the shareholding and affiliation networks is very
heterogeneous while the degree distribution in the interlocking and client networks is much
less heterogenous. The most densely connected layer is the shareholding network layer. The
affiliation, shareholding and client networks show certain level of disassortativity while the
interlocking network shows certain level of assortativity. However, no clear pattern is
observed in the relation between degree and lobby money. We also propose a centrality mea-
sure to capture the influence of organizations in the lobby network. There are different
notions of influence which can be captured by in-centrality and out-centrality. In both cases,
we find that lobby money is not a good predictor of the centrality. While large lobby money
does not imply large influence, there are still some important organizations that have both
large lobby money and centrality. Moreover, we find that out-centrality is not a good predictor
of in-centrality. In particular, the organizations with high in-centrality are mainly professional
associations while the organizations with high out-centrality are mainly banks and asset man-
agement companies.
We finally investigate the lobby network at the mesoscopic and macroscopic levels. At the
mesoscopic level, the organizations are classified in 10 different groups (e.g. banking, insur-
ance, energy, etc.) according to the economic interest. The organizations are further classified
in either the finance domain or climate domain at the macroscopic level. By studying the
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connectivity pattern between different groups and the relations within and across domains, we
find that adding the shareholding and interlocking links from the online Orbis database is very
important for understanding the interactions between lobby organizations. At both mesoscopic
and macroscopic levels, we find that there is an obvious community structure in the affiliation
network, i.e. the interactions between different groups and especially between different
domains are very few. However, cross-group and cross-domain interactions are instead quite
strong shareholding and interlocking links are considered.We observe that shareholding links
are mainly from banks towards companies in the climate domain. In addition, differently from
the other three networks, the shareholding network has a special feature that it is very robust to
the link reshuffling at the mesoscopic and macroscopic levels. After taking into account the
shareholding and interlocking links, the banking group and insurance group turn out to have
highest intra-group mean degree, indicating that these two groups are the most cohesive ones
in the lobby network.
In general, finding an appropriate description of the interaction between layers in a multi-
plex network and show if and when does it make a difference to account for the interaction are
central challenges in the field of complex networks. On the one hand, the paper investigates
each layer separately and compute centrality based on the links in one layer. On the other
hand, we also compute the centrality of lobby organizations accounting for all the layers
together. Accounting for this layer-layer interaction, lead to two types of insights that could
not be obtained from the single layer analysis alone. First, a less connected node in one layer
might eventually turn out to have high centrality if it is well connected in other layers. Second,
there are group of nodes or sectors that appear to be interconnected only once several types of
links are considered. For instance, based on affiliation links, the climate and finance arenas
appear disconnected.However, when shareholding and interlock are also considered they
appear verymuch entangled, which is crucial for policy implications. Of course, several other
layers exist which are not captured in the present study. However, our results suggest that
neglecting the multiplex nature of the lobby network would lead to misleading conclusions on
the relations among sectors.
The analysis carried out in this paper is based on the available snapshot of the multi-layer
network between lobby organizations. One interesting extension is to investigate how the evo-
lution of a given layer influences that of other layers, which asks for further data collection and
analysis in the future.
Methods
Data collection.The “EU transparency register” (http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/) is
publicly available in xml format. We extracted the basic information of all the 6637 organiza-
tions that have registered. Then we extracted two types of links between these organizations as
follows.
• Affiliation layer. In the EU transparency register data (xml file), each organization reports
its member organizations in the “structure” section. For each organization i, we extract the
names from the “structure” section and then do the exact matching with all the names and
acronyms of the 6637 organizations. Once there is an exact string matching, we create an
affiliation link from the matched organization to i, meaning that the matched organization is
affiliated to the target organization. Besides, each organization reports in the “networking”
section the organizations that it belongs to. The information in the“networking” part is com-
posed of free text. For each organization i, we do a string match of all the 6637 organization
names in the free text. If any organization name is matched exactly, then an affiliation link is
created from i to the matched organization.
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• Client layer. In the xml file, the law firms and professional consultant companies list some of
their clients. For each law firm or professional consultant company i, we do the exact string
matching between the listed client names and all the 6637 organization names. If a match is
found, we construct a client link from the matched organization to i.
We then combined the information in the EU transparency register with the online ORBIS
database available under commercial license from Bureau van Dijk. We selected all the organi-
zations registered as companies. The company names were uploaded to the online ORBIS data-
base.When several possible matchings were found, the selectionwas done manually, based on
the profile of the company in the registry and its financial data such as operating revenue. For
the matched companies, we extract some basic financial information, including the operating
revenue, total assets, board directors, and shareholders.
• Interlocking layer. The interlocking links are constructed based on the commonmanagers
between each pair of companies. Therefore, the interlocking network is weighted, with the
link weight equal to the number of common board directors.
• Shareholding layer. The shareholding links are the shareholding relations between the
above matched companies. This network is again a directedweighted network. The weight of
the link is the percentage of shares that a company is holding in the other company.
Note that both data sources do not provide historical information, so it is only possible to
study one time snapshot at this stage.
Centrality measure
We design a simple feedback-centralitymeasure [21] to try and quantify the influence of each
organization in the lobby network. The in-centrality of a node is defined as
ci ¼ ð1   aÞ þ a
X
j
wjiðcj þmjÞ; ð1Þ
In the definition abovemj represents the intrinsic importance of the nodes and it is proxied by
the relative lobby money of node j, i.e.mj = sj/∑h(sh), where sh is the original lobby money of
node j. The matrix wji is a stochastic matrix, with wji ¼
ajiP
h
ajh
, where aji is a component of the
network adjacencymatrix (aji = 1 means that there is a direct link from j to i, and 0 otherwise).
α is a constant (α = 0.85) similar to the dumping factor in the PageRank algorithm [21]. The
influence of block i can be measured by ci after it reaches the stationary value. According to the
definition, the centrality of a node is co-determinedby the centrality and lobby money of the
neighboring nodes, but independent of its own lobby money.
If wji is changed to wij in Eq 1, the obtained cimeasures the out-centrality of nodes i. The
current centrality definition can be easily extended to the multiplex lobby network consisting
of more than one type of links [16]. In this case,wji should be computed as wji ¼
aajiþa
s
jiþa
i
jiP
h
ðaajiþa
s
jiþa
i
jiÞ
where aaji, a
s
ji and a
i
ji represent the adjacencymatrix for the affiliation layer, shareholding layer
and interlocking layer, respectively.
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